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December 1967] Recent Developments 381 
INCOME TAX-Recovered Property Previously Deducted 
Included in Gross Income in Year of Recovery-
Alice Phelan, Sullivan Corp. v. United States* 
In 1989 and 1940 the corporate taxpayer claimed as charitable 
deductions the value of two parcels of realty which it had donated 
to a charitable organization subject to the condition that they be 
used solely for religious or educational purposes. Having decided 
not to use the gifts in the manner specified, the donee reconveyed 
them to the taxpayer in 1957. The taxpayer failed to reflect this 
recovery in its gross income for that year. The Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, however, determined that under section 111 of 
the 1954 Internal Revenue Code (Code)1 the taxpayer's gross income 
• CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (67-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) f 9570 (Ct. Cl. July 20, 
1967) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
I. INT. REY. CoDE of 1954, § Ill. The taxpayer had received a tax: saving from the 
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reported in its 1957 tax return should have included each piece of 
recovered property valued as of the year of deduction. The taxpayer 
paid a deficiency assessment and then sued for a partial refund of 
this assessment in the Court of Claims, relying on that court's earlier 
decision in Perry v. United States2 to establish that an overpayment 
had been made to the extent that the taxes on the recovered prop-
erty exceeded the actual tax savings from the charitable deductions 
in 1939 and 1940.3 On a motion by the Commissioner for summary 
judgment, held, Perry v. United States! is overruled and the tax-
payer's petition is dismissed. To the extent that a taxpayer is able 
to utilize a deduction to reduce his taxable income, a subsequent 
recovery of the property giving rise to the deduction must be in-
cluded in his gross income for the year of recovery and taxed at the 
then current rates. By this decision, the Court of Claims conformed 
its result on this issue to that of other courts which have faced the 
same question. 6 
There are two primary accounting approaches to the compu-
tation of income tax: the transactional method and the annual 
method. The transactional accounting approach treats each transac-
tion separately; thus, the income from each transaction is deter-
prior use of the realty as charitable deductions to which, in the light of the subse• 
quent recovery of the realty, it is no longer entitled. To prevent unjust enrichment 
of the taxpayer the benefit of such a deduction must be offset. Under § 111, the 
usual method of adjustment is to include in gross income for the year of recovery 
the amount of the prior deduction which was recovered, subject to the limitation 
that any part of the deduction which did not result in a reduction of taxes in the 
prior year is not included. See Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. 
R:Ev. 129, 176 (1943). Although § Ill refers only to recovery of "bad debts, prior taxes 
and delinquency amounts," the Supreme Court in Dobson v. Commissioner, 820 U.S. 
489 (1943), impliedly recognized that the rule was not restricted to these specific situ-
ations. The rule is now applied to the recovery of "all other losses, expenditures and 
·accruals ••• made the basis of a deduction ••• ," Treas, Reg. § 1.111-l(a) (1956), 
For leading articles on the tax benefit rule in general, see Plumb, The Tax Benefit 
Rule Today, 57 HAllv. L. R.Ev. 129 (1943); Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Tomorrow, 
57 HARV. L. R.Ev. 675 (1944); Tye, Tile Tax Benefit Rule Reexamined, 3 TA.-..:: L, REY. 
329 (1948). 
2. 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958). 
3. The deductions taken in 1939 and 1940, were $4,248.49 and $4,463.44 respectively. 
Since the tax rates then in effect were 18% (1939) and 24% (1940), the total tax saving 
realized from the deductions was $1,877.49. The Commissioner included the full value 
of each parcel as of the year it was donated, totalling $8,706.93, in the corporation's 
income for 1957, which was taxed at a rate of 52%- The taxpayer contended that it 
was liable only to the e.-..::tent of the tax saving in the prior year and thus claimed 
a refund of $2,650.11-the deficiency assessment for 1957 of $4,527.60 less the prior 
tax saving of $1,877.49. In effect, this method of adjustment taxes the income from 
the recovered property at the rates applicable in the years the deductions were taken, 
4. 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958). 
5. See Estate of William H. Block, 39 B.T.A. 888 (1939), af/'d sub nom. Union Trust 
Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, !Ill U.S. 658 (1940); National 
Bank of Commerce, 40 B.T.A. 72 (1939), a/fd, 115 F.2d 875 (1940), 8 P-H 1967 Fm. TAX 
SERv. 1J 8534, at 8501; l CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1J IUH.01, at 19,248. 
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mined only upon completion of the transaction.6 In contrast, under 
the annual approach, taxable income is computed on the basis of 
the income and expenses resulting from all of the taxpayer's transac-
tions during a single year, including transactions not completed in 
that year. The annual approach thus makes it possible to recognize 
income in one year on a transaction that ultimately results in an 
over-all loss. The Supreme Court in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks 
Co.7 chose to adopt the annual accounting approach, apparently be-
cause of its comparative ease of application and its production of 
revenue to the government at regular intervals.8 Since the Burnet 
decision, the concept of accounting for items of income on an an-
nual basis has become firmly entrenched as a basic principle by 
which the courts interpret and implement our tax laws. 
The court in the principal case believed that the annual account-
ing principle dictated the inclusion of the value of the previously 
deducted property in the gross income of the year of recovery.9 How-
6. Bartlett v. Delaney, 173 F.2d 535, 536 (1st Cir. 1949), afj'g 75 F. Supp. 490 (D. 
Mass. 1948), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 817 (1949). 
7. 282 U.S. 359 (1931). 
8. "It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue 
ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a 
system is it practical to produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of 
accounting, assessment, and collection capable of practical operation." Id. at 365. 
This was contrasted with the transactional method which would postpone "the assess-
ment of the tax until the end of a lifetime, or some other indefinite period • • . ." 
Id. Other e.xpressions of preference for the annual accounting principle as opposed 
to the less definite transactional approach are abundant. See, e.g., Murray v. Commis-
sioner, 232 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1956); Brown v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 
1933), affd, 291 U.S. 193 (1934); F. B. Fawsett, 23 B.T .A. 1148, 1152 (1931), affd, 63 
F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933). See also Surrey, Symposium on 
Law and Accounting, 36 IowA L. REv. 191 (1950). Quasi-transactional methods which 
attempt to superimpose the transactional theory upon the annual system of accounting 
by requiring a prior return to be amended in light of subsequent events have also 
been rejected by the courts on the grounds of administrative inconvenience and a 
lack of finality in income tax liability. Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953); 
Estate of William H. Block, 39 B.T .A. 338 (1939), a/f d sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. 
Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940); Webster, The 
Claim of Right Doctrine; 1954 Version, 10 TAX L. REv. 381 (1955); Surrey&: Warren, 
The Income Tax Project of The American Law Institute: Gross Income, Deductions, 
Accounting, Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66 HAR.v. L. REv. 761, 
795 (1953). 
9. "To insure the vitality of the single year concept, it is essential not only that 
annual income be ascertained without reference to losses experienced in an earlier 
accounting period, but also that income be taxed without reference to earlier tax 
rates." Principal case at 84,847. At one time, the courts amended the prior return to 
disallow the deduction where this was not precluded by the statute of limitations. 
F. B. Elliott Co., 45 B.T.A. 82 (1941). But in Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944), the Supreme Court stated that the annual accounting 
principle precluded the allocation of income to a year other than the year of actual 
receipt (or, for an accrual basis taxpayer, the year in which the right to receive 
income became final), and thereafter courts construed this to mean that such amend-
ment was no longer possible even if the statute of limitations were not a bar. Lexmont 
Corp., 20 T.C. 185 (1953); 2 J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 12.23, at 
99 (1961). 
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ever, this decision may be inequitable to the taxpayer whose ta.x. 
rate has escalated, since he will have to pay more taxes because of 
the _recovery than he saved by virtue of the deduction.10 In Perry v. 
United States,11 the Court of Claims had attempted to remedy this 
inequity by ruling that the tax upon recovery of a previously de-
ducted item should equal the actual reduction of tax liability in the 
year the deduction was taken. This result insured that neither the 
ta.x.payer nor the government would suffer as a result of the recov-
ery.12 The rule adopted by the Perry court was quickly criticized as 
violating the annual accounting principle.13 In the principal case, 
the Court of Claims reacted to this criticism by overruling its deci-
sion in Perry and resurrecting the single year concept.14 It is sub-
mitted, however, that although incorrect as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the Perry rule is desirable in that it retains most of 
the practical advantages of the annual accounting principle while 
providing a more accurate reflection of the taxpayer's true income 
position. 
The Perry rule may be classified as transactional in approach, 
since it does not look merely to the net results of a single year but 
takes into account the total effect on income of a series of related 
transactions. However, the additional administrative inconvenience 
of applying that rule, as opposed to annual accounting rule, appears 
to be slight. To illustrate, under section lll, when a previously 
deducted item of property is recovered, possible tax liability is not 
determined until after an examination of the prior return discloses 
that the deduction resulted in a tax benefit to the taxpayer.111 This 
10. Conversely, if the recovery is taxed at rates lower than those in effect when 
the deduction was taken, the treatment would also be inequitable since the taxpayer 
would be in a better position than it would have been in had it never taken the 
deduction. See, e.g., Central Loan and Inv. Co., 39 B.T.A. 981 (1939). 
11. 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958). For a discussion of the case, see Note, 1959 
DUKE L.J. 151; Note, 33 TUL. L. REv. 247 (1958); Note, 16 WASH. &: LEE L. REv. 
248 (1959). 
12. Other methods similar to the Perry rule have been advocated and rejected. 
American Dental Co., 44 B.T.A. 425 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 128 F.2d 254 (7th 
Cir. 1942), aff d, 318 U.S. 322 (1943); Central Loan and Inv. Co., 39 B.T .A. 981 (1939). 
13. S. SURREY &: W. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 538 (1960); 1 J. MERTENS, 
LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.37, at 99 (1962). See also note 11 supra. The 
Commissioner refused to follow Perry, Rev. Rul. 141, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 17, and the 
Court of Claims itself appeared hesitant to rely on Perry. Citizens Fed. Sav. &: Loan 
Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
14. Principal case at 84,847. 
15. For example, assume a taxpayer has a gross income of $15,000 in year 1, and 
in addition has a deductible item valued at $20,000. Under the § 111 ta.x benefit rule, 
if he recovers the item in year 2, only $15,000 would be included in his gross income 
for year 2 since the remaining $5,000 did not result in a tax benefit (i.e., a reduction 
in tax liability) in year 1. In other words, since only $15,000 of the $20,000 was 
needed to reduce his taxable income in year 1 to zero, only $15,000 of the recovery 
is taxed in year 2. 
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initial determination must be made regardless of whether the Perry 
rule or the rule of the principal case is followed; it is only after a 
finding that some ta.'{ liability exists that the procedures differ. The 
rule in the principal case would require inclusion of the entire value 
of the recovered property in the gross income of the year of recovery, 
if any tax benefit resulted from the prior deduction. Under the 
Perry rule, however, the Commissioner would simply add the actual 
ta.'X: saving produced by the deduction in the prior year to the tax 
liability for the year of recovery computed without the inclusion 
of the recovered item in gross income.16 Thus, the Perry rule re-
quires only the one additional calculation of the actual tax saving 
in the prior year, which does not appear to be prohibitively incon-
venient. 
Moreover, the Perry rule does not force the government to wait 
for an indefinite period before it realizes any tax revenue. While 
the Perry rule may be regarded as transactional to the extent that 
it is concerned with the over-all position of the taxpayer after two 
or more related events, tax liability would still be predicated on 
annual returns, and thus revenue payable to the government would 
be produced at regular intervals.17 In addition, since it requires 
adjustment in the return for the year of recovery rather than the 
year of deduction, the Perry rule overcomes the traditional objection 
to "quasi transactional" approaches that they necessitate the reopen-
ing and amending of prior returns.18 
Since the practical advantages of applying the rule of the prin-
cipal case rather than the Perry rule appear slight, it seems strange 
that the least equitable of the two should be the one adopted. The 
court in the principal case apparently felt the need for explicit 
legislative authorization to depart from the rule followed by other 
courts.19 Given the court's inhibition, one might ask why, in the 
16. It should be noted that this tax benefit rule is itself an exception to the annual 
accounting principle. Using the same example as in note 15 supra, the Commissioner, 
instead of following the Sullivan rule by adding the $15,000 to the tax.payer's gross 
income in year 2, would determine the taxpayer's total tax liability for year 2 by 
computing what the tax liability would have been in year l without using the deduc-
tion, and adding the difference between this amount and the actual tax liability for 
year l computed with the deduction to the tax liability based on the taxpayer's gross 
income in year 2 without the recovery. Thus, the taxpayer is taxed in year 2 only 
to the extent of his actual tax saving in year I. 
17. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
18. Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953); Estate of William H. Block, 39 
B.T.A. 338 (1939), affd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, lll F.2d 60 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940); Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine; 1954 
Version, 10 TAX L. REv. 381 (1955); Surrey & Warren, supra, note 8. 
19. "And absent specific statutory authority sanctioning a departure from this 
principle, it may only be said of Perry that it achieved a result which was more 
equitably just than legally correct." Principal case at ,r 84,847. See also the court's foot-
note 5, appealing to Congress for codification of the Perry rule. 
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face of the arguments that can be mustered in support of the Perry 
rule, Congress has failed to sanction this exception to the single-
year concept. 
When the tax benefit rule was originally adopted, Congress was 
aware of the inequities involved in situations like that in the prin-
cipal case, and, in fact, it rejected a proposed solution identical to 
that found in Perry.20 In contrast, Congress did take action with 
respect to a similar adjustment problem arising in the "claim of 
right" context. Assume an employer mistakenly overpays his em-
ployee by $5,000 in year 1. In year 2, the employer discovers the 
mistake and requires the taxpayer to return the extra $5,000. This 
situation is similar to that in the principal case in that some adjust-
ment must be made to reflect the change in the employee's income 
position. In effect, he has paid taxes on $5,000 of income that he 
was not permitted to retain. In United States v. Lewis,21 the Supreme 
Court held that a taxpayer in this situation should deduct from 
gross income in year 2 the amount which he was forced to return. 
This result was not wholly satisfactory on the facts of Lewis, since 
the taxpayer was taxed at a lower rate in year 2 and thus realized a 
tax saving in that year which was less than the additional taxes orig-
inally paid when the item was included in gross income in year 1.22 
Congress responded to the Lewis case by enacting section 1341 
of the Code.23 Under this provision, if the tax saving produced by 
20. I suggest, however, that the ta.x benefit rule should take the form, not of 
limiting the amount of income to be reported in the year of recovery and then 
taxing it at the rates applicable to such year, but of limiting the tax for such year 
to the amount of tax saved by the prior deduction. This will more nearly square 
with the real purpose of taxing such recoveries, which is to neutralize the benefits 
derived from the prior deduction. 
Statement of Ellsworth C. Alvord, Washington, D.C. Chairman, Committee on Fed• 
eral Finance, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Hearings on H.R. 7378 
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1784 (1942). See also id. at 
1802. The subsequent committee report did not provide a reason for the failure of 
Congress to adopt the proposed method. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). 
21. 340 U.S. 590 (1951). 
22. The inequities of this procedure were again brought before the Court in Healy 
v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953). The Court followed the Lewis decision empha-
sizing that such a result was necessitated by the annual accounting principle. 
23. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1341. The pertinent part of this section provides: 
(a) General rule-If-
(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or years) 
because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such 
item; 
(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was established 
after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did 
not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such item; 
and 
(3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $3,000 then the tax imposed by this 
chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the following: 
(4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or 
(5) an amount equal to-
(A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction minus 
(B) the decrease in tax under this chapter (or the correspondi~g pro-
visions of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year (or years) which 
December 1967] Recent Developments 387 
the deduction in year 2 is less than the amount the tax liability was 
increased in year 1 due to the improper inclusion of an item in 
gross income, the tax for year 2 is computed without a deduction 
for the item returned and the taxpayer then receives a credit against 
the amount computed for the additional tax paid in year 1.24 The 
similarity between this approach and the Perry rule is readily 
apparent. 
Congress has also remedied another inequity very similar to that 
found in the principal case. If a taxpayer had deducted an amount 
paid to a third party as a result of an adverse judgment in a patent 
infringement suit, and subsequently recovers the amount because 
the judgment is reversed, section 1342 of the Code25 operates to in-
clude the amount recovered in the gross income in the year of 
recovery unless the increase in taxes due to the inclusion of the 
recovery in gross income is greater than the prior tax saving realized 
when the deduction was taken. In that event, the recovery is taxed 
in much the same manner as under the Perry rule.26 
would result solely from the exclusion of such item (or portion thereof) 
from gross income for such prior taxable year (or years). 
24. If in the hypothetical, the $5,000 subsequently returned was originally taxed 
in year I at a rate of 30%, the additional tax would have been $1,500. But if the 
rate in effect in year 2 is 20%, and if the $5,000 must be deducted in year 2, a tax 
saving of only $1,000 will result. The government will be unjustly enriched by $500. 
In this event, § 134l(a)(5) requires that $1,500-the additional tax in year I-be 
applied as a credit against the tax liability in year 2, computed without the $5,000 
deduction. 
Note that if the rates were reversed, under § 1341 the Lewis rule would still be 
applied and the taxpayer would deduct the item at the higher tax rate in year 2. 
Thus, the original tax in year 1 would have been $1,000, but the deduction in the 
year 2 would produce a $1,500 tax saving allowing the taxpayer a $500 windfall. The 
Code does not take into account this possible inequity to the government and unjust 
enrichment of the taxpayer, and in this respect the Perry rule would appear superior. 
25. INT. RE:v. CoDE of 1954, § 1342. The pertinent part of this section provides: 
(a) General rulc-1£-
(1) an item was deducted from gross income for a prior taxable year (or years) 
because it appeared that another person held an unrestricted right to such 
item as a result of a court decision in a patent infringement suit (whether 
or not the taxpayer is a party to such suit); and 
(2) gross income is increased for the taxable year because it was established 
after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that such other person 
did not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such 
item because of the subsequent reversal of such court decision on the 
ground that such decision was induced by fraud or undue influence; and 
(3) the amount of such increase in gross income exceeds $3,000, then the tax 
imposed by this chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the 
folfowing: 
(4) the ta.x for the taxable year computed with the gross income so increased; 
or 
(5) an amount equal to-
(A) the tax for the ta.xable year computed without such increase in gross 
income, plus 
(B) the increase in tax (including interest) under this chapter (or the cor-
responding provisions of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year 
(or years) which would result solely from the elimination of such item 
(or portion thereof) as a deduction from gross income for such prior 
taxable year (or years). 
26. For instance, if the recovery in the principal case was covered by § 1342, the 
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There is no apparent reason for the failure of Congress to legis-
late the Perry approach.27 In the past, Congress has enacted pro-
visions to mitigate the harsh results of a strict application of the 
annual accounting principle in a variety of situations.28 Enactment 
of sections 1341 and 1342 shows that Congress does not feel con-
strained by the annual accounting principle in situations similar 
to that of the principal case. In fact, the tax benefit rule20 is itself 
an exception to the annual accounting principle, designed to pro-
vide a more equitable solution to the problem of taxing the recovery 
of property previously deducted.30 However, as illustrated by the 
principal case, inequities may still result. By adopting the Perry 
rule, Congress would not only eliminate these remaining inequities, 
but also extend the reasoning behind the tax benefit rule to its 
logical conclusion.31 
contention of the taxpayer would have been sustained. However, under § 1342, if the 
increase in tax due to the inclusion of the recovery in gross income is less than the 
tax saving realized when the deduction was taken in effect the rule of the principal 
case is applied. The ta.xpayer would then still retain a tax saving to which he has no 
equitable claim. Again, it would seem that the Perry rule is superior since it takes 
into account the equities of both the government and the taxpayer and insures that 
neither will receive an unintended ta.x benefit. 
27. It could be argued that the additional inconvenience necessitated by the Perry 
rule precludes its adoption. However, as pointed out above, any additional adminis-
trative inconvenience does not seem to be prohibitive. See note 16 supra and accom-
panying text. In any event, it would seem that the equitable advantages of the Perry 
rule would counterbalance most objections based on convenience. See Surrey 8: 
·warren, supra note 8. If it is felt that such objections present a serious obstacle to 
the adoption of the Perry rule, application of the Sullivan rule could be retained in 
situations where the recovery is small and has a minor impact on the taxpayer's in-
come position while providing for application of the Perry rule only in those situa-
tions where the recovery produces a significant impact on the ta.xpayer's income 
position. This result could be reached by imposing a requirement, similar to that 
found in § 1342, that the recovery must produce an increase in gross income more 
than $3,000 before the Perry rule would be applied. Perhaps it might also be argued, 
if one is to assume that the general trend of tax rates is upward, that adoption of 
the Perry rule will result in a decrease in tax revenue to the government. But, this 
argument loses much of its force when it is recognized that the revenue lost is that 
to which the government does not hold an equitable claim, and, in effect, its retention 
under the Sullivan rule is a form of unjust enrichment. 
28. For a list of other provisions of the Code-aside from §§ 1341 and 1342-
which take exception to the principle, see Note, 1959 DuKE L.J. 151, 153, n.15. 
29. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § lll. 
30. See Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REv. 129, 176 (1943). 
31. The American Law Institute (ALI) has also proposed that the present method 
be discarded. Their alternative would include the full amount of the recovery in 
gross income for the year of recovery. However, if the item is in excess of either 
$2,000 or 20% of the current net income, the taxpayer has the option of excluding 
the recovery and amending the prior return to disallow the deduction. ALI Fm. 
INCOME TAX STAT. §§ X332, X333 (Feb. 1954 Draft). It would appear, however, that 
in two respects the Perry rule is superior to this proposal. First, the Perry rule insures 
that both the taxpayer and the govenment will receive equitable treatment while 
the ALI proposal still leaves a possibility that the government will receive inequitable 
treatment. In addition, by requiring all adjustments in the current year, the Perry 
rule escapes the difficulties of reopening and amending the prior return. 
